Solar export remuneration: What changes in 2027 and why

From 2027 the nationwide solar export remuneration in Switzerland will become more dynamic. It will be tied to the hourly market price. This change is central for future system and grid stability. For small producers it creates opportunities but also requires action. A closer look. 

Distribution grid operators are legally obliged to buy electricity from production facilities up to a certain size (<3 MW), provided that the electricity is not sold otherwise. With the Electricity Act, parliament introduced a harmonised, nationwide, quarterly-based export remuneration for this so‑called purchase-and-remuneration obligation. However, this system will only apply until the end of this year and will then be replaced. Under the current system, the remuneration for renewable electricity corresponds to the market revenue of reference plants averaged over a quarter of the total. For small installations (<150 kW) a minimum remuneration set by the Federal Council also applies. This caps the quarterly price from below, so that the smallest installations in any case receive around 6 Rappen/kWh (100 Rappen = 1CHF) of injected electricity.

A quarterly-fixed export remuneration, however, poses significant problems for system and grid stability: because of the rigid price, plant owners have no incentive to control their feed-in or to refrain from feeding in when demand is low. Even when there are negative market prices — because there is too much electricity available — and the grid is often under stress as a result, it is still financially attractive for owners of solar systems to feed in at full output. After all, they receive the fixed quarterly price for every unit fed into the grid. They also have no incentive to time their feed-in, for example by charging a car battery at midday during the peak of solar feed-in instead of in the morning. The result of such misaligned incentives is additional congestion in the electricity grid and higher system costs. In 2025, the large fluctuations in the Swiss electricity system related to the growth of solar capacity cost around €281 million, according to ElCom.

Parliament reacted to this challenge in 2025. From January 2027, due to an amendment to the law, the quarter price will no longer apply as remuneration; instead the hourly price will be used. The minimum remuneration will be continued in the form of a premium.

How the new system works

The basic logic of the system is simple: electricity from solar installations fed into the grid receives the market price for each hour of the day. For example, the market price — and thus the export remuneration — could be 6 Rappen/kWh in the morning, fall to 0 Rappen/kWh at midday and rise again to 8 Rappen/kWh in the evening. Depending on which hours the producer feeds in and how much, they can earn more or less revenue. If they feed in during negative-price hours, they must pay accordingly.

Continuing the minimum remuneration, however, makes the system a little more complex. The minimum remuneration will now be secured through a premium. This works as follows: at the end of the quarter the market price on average earned by the reference plants (the so‑called reference market price) is compared with the minimum remuneration. If the reference market price is below the minimum remuneration, the difference is added as a premium on top of the hourly remuneration. So if the minimum remuneration is 6 Rappen/kWh and the reference plant would on average have earned only 4 Rappen/kWh, then every producer receives an additional 2 Rappen as a premium for each kilowatt hour fed in during that quarter. In the earlier example, the final export remuneration would therefore be 8 Rappen/kWh in the morning (6 market price + 2 premium), 2 Rappen/kWh at midday (0 + 2) and 10 Rappen/kWh in the evening (8 + 2).

What does this mean for solar system owners?

For “prosumers” — i.e., households or SMEs with their own solar system — the remuneration for their electricity becomes more dynamic. In hours with high demand (e.g., evenings) it will generally increase, and at midday during oversupply it will fall. Those who follow these price signals and, for example, use batteries and shift consumption (heat pumps, electric vehicles) or temporarily halt feed-in when needed, can improve the profitability of their system. Those who do not engage in this will lose out.

The minimum remuneration premium, however, will continue to support the profitability of their own system. As long as the producer performs at least as well as the reference plants, they will in total always receive the set minimum remuneration. If they tend to feed in at higher-priced hours, they will even gain on top of that.

What does this mean for consumers without solar panels?

Households without their own solar production are, of course, not directly affected by the change in export remuneration. Indirectly they benefit from lower system costs: because hourly export remuneration reduces misaligned incentives and feed-in peaks, it prevents inefficient grid expansion and lowers costs for system stability.

At the same time, however, the continuation of the minimum export remuneration means that consumers in the basic supply — where the electricity from the purchase obligation is sold — will continue to pay too much for electricity. They pay not only the market price for the solar electricity, i.e. the actual value, but also the premium arising from the minimum remuneration.

A first step, but misaligned incentives remain

Hourly remuneration is an important starting point for greater system and grid stability. Misaligned incentives nevertheless remain. Because the minimum remuneration premium is also paid in negative-price hours, it can be financially worthwhile to continue feeding in when prices are slightly negative (provided the premium is higher than the payment required due to negative prices). Temporarily stopping feed-in during negative-price hours would be legally possible, but has not yet been implemented at the ordinance level.

Dynamic export remunerations are ultimately only one piece of the puzzle to better align the consumption and production behaviour of prosumers with system needs. Another important element are the dynamic network tariffs explicitly introduced by the Electricity Act. Crucial would also be dynamic energy prices for electricity consumption; a more widespread rollout of those would be promoted by the full market opening envisaged, for example, under the electricity agreement.

With the increasing build-out of renewable energy, it will become unavoidable that all producers and consumers contribute with their behaviour and flexibility to system and grid stability. It will be decisive that accurate price signals reach them. This may require some adjustment for many, but it also offers opportunities. Ultimately, it will also make electricity storage more attractive — even without subsidies.